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I. INTRODUCTION
There is in no other profession and in no other country anything equal to the
student-edited American law review, nurtured without commercial objective
in university law schools alive to the imperfections of the law, and alert to
make space for the worthy commentary of an unknown student as well as for
the worthy solicited or unsolicited manuscript of renowned authority....
Time is with the law reviews. An age that churns up problems more rapidly
than we can solve them needs such fiercely independent problem-solvers with
long range solutions. 1
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REviEw.
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of Trustees, Nebraska Groundwater Foundation, 1983-96; Governor's Water
Council, 1994-95.
1. Judge Roger Traynor, To The Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REv. 3,
8-10 (1962).
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When the editor-in-chief of the Nebraska Law Review asked me to
write an article for this issue, I decided the occasion was appropriate
to describe law reviews and then discuss some of the principal criti-
cisms aimed against them: law reviews have obscure writing, are full
of useless theoretical articles, are poorly edited by immature students
who are ill-prepared to judge good scholarship, have an excessive
number of board members, have insufficient faculty involvement, and
contain too many footnotes. The last criticism is easy to answer. Read
only the text. The other criticisms raise more complicated problems.
This commentary begins by describing a typical law review institu-
tion and the reasons why students join. Then, it sets out in some de-
tail harsh attacks made by Professor Fred Rodell of Yale, Dean Roger
Cramton of Cornell, and Judge Harry Edwards, a former professor at
both Harvard and the University of Michigan before his appointment
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. Lastly, this article examines reasons for the noticeable shift from
"practical" to "theoretical" commentary in the nation's law reviews,
and, in addition, the allegation that this switch has made the reviews
useless to lawyers and judges.
I admit a bias. I very much like law reviews, the Nebraska Law
Review in particular, because the articles have been of great help to
me. One can take special pride in noting that between 1989 and 1991,
the article most cited by all the courts in the United States was pub-
lished in our Review.2
II. A CURIOUS WAY OF DOING THINGS
Law reviews are a unique institution found only in American law
colleges. 3 They are run completely by students who publish between
two and eight issues each year. Some schools have a number of re-
views. For instance, Harvard4 has twelve publications; Columbia,5
2. Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 871,
902 (1996). The Nebraska Law Review article written by John E.B. Myers, Jan
Bays, Judith Becker, Lucy Berliner, David L. Corwin, and Karen J. Saywitz was
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1989). The
article is a good example of interdisciplinary work: one author was a law profes-
sor, two had M.D. degrees, two had Ph.D degrees, and one had an M.S.W. degree.
3. Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution: The American Law Re-
view, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1986). For a well written rejoinder to Cramton's
indictment of the student editors, see Philip M. Nichols, A Student Defense of
Student Edited Journals: In Response to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 Du=E
L.J. 1122 (stating that at the time he wrote the rebuttal, Philip Nichols was edi-
tor-in-chief of the Duke Law Journal).
4. Harvard publishes Harvard BlackLetter Journal, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Lib-
erties Law Review, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Harvard Human Rights
Journal, Harvard International Law Journal, Harvard Journal of Law & Public
Policy, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Harvard Journal on Legislation,
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Michigan, 6 and Yale,7 eight; Stanford,8 five; and Cardozo,9 four. It is
quite a surprise to discover the number of these publications. The
Harvard Law Review was first published in the spring of 1887. By
1928, forty-two years later, thirty-three student reviews had emerged.
By 1944, just before most of the schools closed during World War II,
there were fifty-five reviews in operation.' 0 The most recent figures I
have seen were compiled by Professor Michael Hoffheimer," who lists
Harvard Latino Law Review, Harvard Women's Law Journal, Harvard Law Re-
view, and Negotiation Journal.
5. Columbia publishes Columbia Business Law Review, Columbia Human Rights
Law Review, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Columbia Journal of Eu-
ropean Law, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, Columbia Journal of Trans-
national Law, Columbia Law Review, and Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the
Arts.
6. Michigan publishes the Michigan Business Law Journal, Michigan Journal of
Gender and Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Michigan Journal of
Law Reform, Michigan Journal of Race and Law, Michigan Law and Policy Re-
view, Michigan Law Review, and the Michigan Telecommunications and Technol-
ogy Law Review.
7. Yale publishes the Yale Journal of International Law, Yale Journal of Law and
Feminism, Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, Yale Journal of Law and the
Humanities, Yale Journal of World Public Order, Yale Journal on Regulation,
Yale Law and Policy Review, and the Yale Law Journal.
8. Stanford publishes the Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Stanford Journal
of International Law, Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, Stanford
Law and Policy Review, and the Stanford Law Review.
9. Cardozo publishes the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, Cardozo
Journal of International & Comparative Law, Cardozo Law Review, and the Car-
dozo Women's Law Journal.
10. For a comprehensive history of law reviews, see Michael I. Swygert & Jon W.
Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Ed-
ited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739 (1986).
It is remarkable that almost all of the law reviews follow the same general
model, although variations do exist. The Chicago-Kent Law Review, for example,
uses a Faculty Symposium Model. A committee comprised of three faculty and
two students chooses topics for this "all-symposium"journal. The Review usually
pays contributing authors honoraria. Randy Barnett, Beyond the Moot Law Re-
view: A Short Story With a Happy Ending, 70 Cm-KENT L. REv. 123 (1994).
Journals also are categorized as refereed or nonrefereed periodicals. An au-
thor submitting an article to a refereed journal cannot simultaneously submit it
elsewhere. The piece usually is sent to two faculty members in the same field
who are ignorant of the author's identity. This process makes timely publication
impossible. Even worse, valuable faculty time is spent reading rather than writ-
ing. Further, many do not believe the materials found in the refereed periodicals
are of any higher caliber than those found in the nonrefereed periodicals.
11. MICHAEL H. HOFFHEMER, ANDERsON's 1997 DIRECTORY OF LAw REviEws AND
SCHOLARLY LEGAL PERIODICALS 1-11 (1997). Kenneth Lasson noted that as of
1990, more than 800 legal periodicals were in operation. Kenneth Lasson, Schol-




172 general student-edited law reviews in the country, plus 242 spe-
cial focus student-edited journals.' 2
It is estimated these periodicals turn out 150,000 to 190,000 pages
each year, so it is clear that the reviews themselves are an important
part of the legal service industry. They remain, however, only a frac-
tion of the $100 billion spent each year for legal services (a figure that
does not include the cost of house counsel).' 3
The student-edited law reviews are supported partly by subscrip-
tion proceeds, but most of the costs are paid by the parent law school.
Offices, secretarial help, and word-processing equipment usually are
provided. Most schools grant stipends or scholarships to editors, and
the editors also commonly earn hours of credit to fulfill graduation
requirements.
Reviews are divided into two parts. The first component contains
what are called "lead articles." Most of these are authored by law
professors, but judges, attorneys, and persons from disciplines other
than law also contribute. The second component consists of student
written work, i.e., comments, casenotes, essays, and book reviews. No
item is printed unless the law review editors decide it is correct in fact
and form and suitable in subject matter.
It is said that law reviews do not take stands on political questions,
but that is untrue. When a review selects articles in one particular
area rather than another, it immediately becomes an important actor
in our continuing national dialogue. Certainly the law reviews have
provided a meaningful and important forum for feminists, supporters
of critical legal studies, critical race scholars, and the law and econom-
ics movement.' 4 I have read of only two exceptions to the "don't be
explicitly political" maxim. The first occurred when forty-four editors
of the Harvard Law Review, "speaking for themselves," published a
statement critical of the Vietnam War; the second when the George-
town Law Journal protested apartheid in South Africa by refusing to
renew the University of South Africa's subscription.' 5
12. In addition, there are 187 nonstudent-edited peer review and trade journals.
HOFFHEimER, supra note 11, at 29-41. This brings the total number of journals
listed by Professor Hoffheimer to more than 600.
13. See The Rule of Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 3. A 1991 article reported
that litigation has spawned a $30 billion plus per year industry. Alex M. John-
son, Jr., Think Like A Lawyer, Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between
Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1240 (1991). See also
Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools Without Lawyers? Winds of Change in Legal Edu-
cation, 81 VA. L. REv. 1421, 1441-51 (1995).
14. For an interesting article on the influence of theoretical inquiry, see Peter H.
Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323 (1989).
15. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 922
(1988). Rosenkranz levels a number of criticisms at law reviews, and his article
was published despite objections by some members of the Hastings Law Journal.
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There are three methods of selecting members for a review-
"grade-on," "write-on," or "publish-on."16 At this institution, all stu-
dents in the upper ten percent scholastically at the end of the first
year are invited to become members. In addition, we have a write-on
procedure in which any student who passed the first year without be-
ing on academic probation can enter the competition, which is judged
solely by the current editorial board. Our review has no procedure to
gain admission by submitting a student note that is accepted for
publication.
Before discussing the purpose of a law review, one further observa-
tion should be made. The editor-in-chief of the Nebraska Law Review
is chosen by all members, and she sets the tone for the enterprise. She
is the governing authority. For instance, in the event of a conflict be-
tween an editor and an author who has submitted a manuscript for
publication, her decision is final.i7 One can only wonder about this
strange and remarkable circumstance of student oversight and
control.
Consider the following scenario. Professor Roger Law Bright (Phi
Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif, law review at Elite Law School, B.C.L.
Oxbridge) is hired by our law college to teach jurisprudence. Susan
Bluebook, a bright but inexperienced second-year student whose ap-
plication for admission to Oxbridge was refused, is a law review edi-
tor. Roger is evaluating a paper Susan has submitted to him for three
hours of credit for independent research. At the same time, as an edi-
tor Susan is evaluating a manuscript written by Roger in the style
advocated by the critical legal studies movement. Roger's future sal-
ary, but more importantly his chances for promotion to associate pro-
fessor and the likelihood of eventually gaining tenure are dependent
upon Susan's evaluation.1S A month passes, and then Susan reports
Of all the articles I have read about law reviews, this is the most interesting and
readable.
16. Rosenkranz's article contains an excellent discussion of membership requisites.
Id. at 891-99. See also Josh E. Fidler, Law-Review Operations and Management,
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48, 52-55 (1983)(discussing law review membership require-
ments); Michael Vitiello, In Defense of Student-Run Law Reviews, 17 CUMB. L.
REv. 859, 866-69 (1987)(same).
17. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAw REVIEws, MODEL CODE OF ETmIcs Rule 2.3[5].
For a discussion of the Model Code, see Michael L. Closen & Robert M. Jarvis,
The National Conference of Law Reviews Model Code of Ethics: Final Text and
Comments, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 509 (1992).
18. See generally Paul D. Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the
Opening of the Legal Profession Since 1776, 44 FLA. L. REv. 501, 596-97
(1992)(discussing the "tenure article"). For arguments discussing why scholarly
writing should be a prerequisite to granting tenure, see Robert H. Abrams, Sing
Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 10-13
(1987); Mary Kay Kane, Some Thoughts on Scholarship for Beginning Teachers,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 14-15 (1987); Aviam Soifer, Musings, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
20, 20 (1987). For a farcical account about submitting articles and dealing with
1997]
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that Roger's work is overly polemical and unpublishable. Her ap-
praisal embarrasses Roger and may irrevocably harm his career in
academe. Of course, with sufficient patience and enough postage
stamps, Roger eventually will get his work published somewhere.
Nevertheless, later publication cannot solve his predicament because
regardless of what happens at this point, Roger has been repudiated
by his own school's law review. Such role reversal would be regarded
as bizarre in other departments of a university and in the great cen-
ters of learning abroad.
III. WHY DO STUDENTS JOIN LAW REVIEWS?
Law schools enjoy a symbiotic relationship with judges and the
practicing bar. The schools act as the initial gatekeeper for the legal
profession by utilizing entrance examinations to screen persons who
show little or no aptitude for law. They then rank their students in
numerical order each year according to grades and cumulative class
standing.
All this is very helpful to law firms and to judges because the data
enable them to reduce the number of potential employees they need to
interview. But the best help of all to employers is the certification
'law review student." This guarantees that the "school within the
school" has trained the student to perform many of the tasks judges
and lawyers want employees to do. It is this ultimate law review cre-
dential that truly saves employers tremendous amounts of time,
money, and energy.
In the final analysis, it is true that most students join a law review
board because membership is a tremendous asset in the job market.
Of course, some join because they think a law review experience is the
best education the school has to offer. Others enjoy the prestige of
being known as a "law review student." There is also a real feeling of
personal satisfaction when a huge amount of hard work results in a
published article.
I might say parenthetically that it is possible to resign from a law
review board and yet be successful, even attain fame and great pres-
tige. One very prominent jurist, Judge Learned Hand, quit the
Harvard Law Review after working on only four of eight issues. Hand
said he was at Harvard "to get a legal education, not to edit or write
parts of a magazine . "..."19
law review editors, see C. Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing: How to Write Law
Review Articles for Fun and Profit, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1994).
To note, the Nebraska Law Review's policy for in-house submissions requires
the entire Editorial Board to review the article and vote to accept or reject the
submission by a majority of members.
19. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 44 (1994).
[Vol. 76:681686
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IV. IS CRITICISM OF LAW REVIEWS JUSTIFIED OR IS IT
"FULL OF SOUND AND FURY, SIGNIFYING
NOTHING?"20
The criticism of law reviews has been bitter, and, not surprisingly,
most of it has come from law professors.21 I will focus on the attacks
made by Professor Rodell, Dean Cramton, and Judge Edwards, as
they are among the most critical and most celebrated.
The best known, or perhaps most notorious article assailing the
reviews was published in 1936 by Yale Law School Professor Fred Ro-
dell, who at that time was twenty-nine-years-old.22 His now famous
quip was that "[tihere are two things wrong with almost all legal writ-
ing. One is its style. The other is its content. That, I think, about
covers the ground."23 Because this piece prepared the way for the at-
tacks that followed, we should take a brief look at his complaints.
First, he complained that the reviews lack humor. But, since Rodell
wrote, there have been some very funny exceptions.24
20. WILLI SHxEsPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
21. Justice Holmes called the student-written notes in the reviews "the work of boys."
He was once heard to say, "I don't mind when the lads say I was wrong; it is when
they say 'Mr. Justice Holmes was correct' that I find them insufferable." Paul A.
Freund, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPRErE COURT 1789-1978: THEm LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1759 (Leon Fried-
man & Fred L. Israil eds., 1980). Holmes' comments remind me of the lawyer
who remarked, after the Supreme Court agreed with his arguments, "I still think
I was right." Charles Evans Hughes, Foreward, 50 YALE L.J. 737 (1941).
Of all the law review critics, Chicago-Kent Professor James Lindgren probably
has been the most severe. As recently as 1994, he said that "[olur scholarly jour-
nals are in the hands of incompetents.... They select articles without knowing
the subject, without knowing the scholarly literature, without understanding
what the manuscript says, without consulting expert referees .... Then they try
to rewrite every sentence." James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 527, 527 (1994).
Boston University Professor Wendy J. Gordon answers Professor Lindgren.
She thinks Lindgren "is a bit overheated," but she agrees, as I do, that his com-
ments are thoughtful, and he does have a point, i.e., the task of publishing law
reviews can be done better. Wendy J. Gordon, Counter-Manifesto: Student-Ed-
ited Reviews and the Intellectual Properties of Scholarship, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 541
(1994).
Yale Professor Geoffrey Hazard says that it generally is agreed that the prin-
cipal value of law reviews is to educate students. "But it has not been satisfacto-
rily explained why it is any more necessary to publish the product of a student
legal writing program than to publish the briefs written for intramural moot
court competitions." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
135 n.82 (1963). See also Authur Nussbaum, Some Remarks About the Position of
Student-Editors of the Law Review, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381 (1955); Carol Sanger,
Editing, 82 GEo. L.J. 513 (1993).
22. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
23. Id. at 38.
24. See "Do We Have to Know This for the Exam?," 7 CONST. ComiENTA RY 223 (1990).
This one-page article shows the votes by a disoriented Supreme Court in a bound-
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Among other complaints, Rodell thought the reviews were too po-
lite. Writers do not say what they are really thinking. Roden sug-
gested the following as a representative example: "Justice
Fussbudget, in a long-winded and vacuous opinion, managed to twist
his logic and mangle his history so as to reach a result which is not
only reactionary but ridiculous."25
Personally, I was taught lack of civility is more a vice than a virtue.
Certainly many of us have said "Your Honor" to people who ordinarily
would not be considered deserving of the greeting. In an article imme-
diately following Rodell's, Garrard Glenn pointed out that civility
makes life more pleasant and does not involve any sacrifice of convic-
tions. Glenn thought, and I agree, that "[iut may be tiresome to say 'I
submit that this is erroneous' instead of saying 'It is a lie'...." but the
indirect language does make our lives more comfortable. 26
Professor Rodell makes a number of further charges: the sentences
are too long, awkward constructions abound, and such common usage
as "I" or "me" is regarded as shocking form.27 But the major indict-
ments are really two. First, footnotes are far too numerous and usu-
ally are excuses "to let the law review writer be obscure and befuddled
in the body of his article and then say the same thing at the bottom of
the page the way he should have said it in the first place."28 Second,
things are unlikely to change because everybody connected with a law
review has "some sort of bread and butter, in a nice way of course, and
all of them-professors, students, and practicing lawyers-are quite
content to go on buttering their own and each other's bread."29 Profes-
sor Rodell believed that the choice jobs for student-editors after gradu-
ation, the promotions for professors, and the free grub work for law
firms made change inconceivable.
ary dispute case, Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376 (1990). For another
sample of wit, see Professor Ronald B. Lansing's footnoting of the nursery rhyme
Humpty Dumpty. Ronald B. Lansing, The Creative Bridge Between Authors and
Editors, 45 MD. L. Ray. 241, 249 (1986). I might mention parenthetically that
Mother Goose actually has been annotated, and Humpty Dumpty has appeared in
several forms. See WiLmAm S. BARiNG-GOULD & CEn. BARinG-GoULD, THE ANNo-
TATED MOTHER GOOSE: NURSERY RHYMEs OLD AND NEW, ARRANGED AND Ex-
PLAINED 268-69 (1962).
25. Rodell, supra note 22, at 39.
26. Garrard Glenn, Law Reviews-Notes of an Antediluvian, 23 VA. L. REv. 46, 46-47
(1936).
27. Rodell, supra note 22, at 39. This practice began to change in the 1950s. Judge
Jerome Frank wrote that in his previous books, he shunned the first-person pro-
noun by saying "the writer" when he meant "I." He concluded, "It]hat assumption
now seems to me a mistake." See JEROm FRNmK, COURTS ON TRAL, at vii-viii
(1950).
28. Rodell, supra note 22, at 40.
29. Id. at 45.
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Professor Rodell remarked that the reviews had been panned
before to no avail,30 and he correctly predicted that his commentary
would have no effect.3 1 He added that he would write no more law
journal articles.3 2 Rodell broke the promise twenty-five years later
when, at the invitation of the Virginia Law Review, he wrote a sequel
to his original piece.33
The next big blast came in 1986 from Roger Cramton, a past presi-
dent of the Association of American Law Schools and former dean of
Cornell Law School. His comments are among the most critical.
While Professor Rodell was a nonconformist, somewhat of a maverick,
Dean Cramton was part of the elite within the bar-prominent, well-
known, and well-respected. His comments got attention. Cramton's
main points include (1) consultation between law review editors and
faculty has declined substantially; (2) students do not have sufficient
background to recognize the merit of submissions; (3) with open ad-
missions policies, law review students are only marginally better than
the rest, and giving them a superior educational experience cannot be
justified; and (4) democratizing the law review experience by doubling
the size of staffs and selecting some members after "arduous competi-
tive writing exercises" has not only removed meritocracy from the pro-
cess, but has resulted in much wasted time.3 4 Dean Cramton
observed that judging competitive writing contests does "not contrib-
ute in any way to publication of student notes or editing of lead
articles."35
In the final analysis, Dean Cramton did acknowledge that law re-
view work is a valuable educational experience,3S but he also observed
that unless matters change, there would be head-on challenges to the
student-edited law reviews.3 7 He believed these challenges would
come from learned societies and from law faculties.38 The dean ended
his commentary by writing, "change is underway."39 He then noted
that the increased separation between the law schools and the legal
profession may lead to tensions and conflicts that radically alter fi-
ture arrangements. 40
And that brings us to Judge Harry Edwards. His important and
provocative 1992 article in the Michigan Law Review castigated, in
30. Id. at 38.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962).
34. Cramtn, supra note 3, at 6-9.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 9-10.




blunt terms, both the legal profession and the law schools.41 Interest-
ingly, the resulting howl came almost entirely from the usually quiet
academic world.42 My first reaction when I read the piece was that I
had not seen such disapproval since reading Judge Jerome Frank's
Courts on Trial in 1950.43 Frank argued that legal education should
be connected more closely to what lawyers were doing. He wanted
more practical legal education and proposed that the core of a law
school "would be a sort of sublimated law office." 44 The pressure from
others of like mind in the bar resulted in the establishment of clinical
programs that give legal education a more "practical" look.4 5
Judge Edwards' focus is similar to Judge Frank's. Edwards makes
the point that there is a profound "disjunction between legal education
and the legal profession."46 Because of the disjunction, scholarship in
the law schools is not even close to the real world. Law journal arti-
cles are theoretical dialogues, mostly between professors, and thus the
literature is not merely unhelpful to lawyers and judges, but is
useless.47
41. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)[hereinafter Edwards, Disjunction].
Judge Edwards has since elaborated on the same topic several times. See Harry
T. Edwards, A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567 (1997);
Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession," 69 WASH. L. REV. 561 (1994).
42. The response to the judge's article was truly amazing. For instance, in an ex-
traordinary gesture, the Michigan Law Review dedicated an entire issue to a
symposium about Judge Edwards' views. Symposium, Legal Education, 91 hcH.
L. REV. 1921 (1993). The authors included some of the nation's best known law
professors-George Priest, Paul Brest, James Boyd White, Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Paul Reigold, Sanford Levinson, Derrick Bell, Pierre Schlag, Robert
Gordon, Nadine Strossen, Lee Bollinger, and James White. Judges Richard Pos-
ner, Louis Pollak, and James Oakes also participated. Finally, Judge Edwards
himself wrote a postscript to his original article. For a synopsis of the commen-
tary in the symposium issue, see Michael J. Saks et al., Is There A Growing Gap
Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of
Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 352, 356-59
(1996). This article was first published in 1994 but was reprinted because errone-
ous data appeared in the original.
43. FAm.x, supra note 27. The judge asked
[w]hat would we say of a medical school where students were taught
surgery solely from a printed page? No one, if he could do otherwise,
would teach the art of playing golf by having the teacher talk about golf
to the prospective player and having the latter read a book relating to
the subject.
Id. at 229.
44. Id. at 238.
45. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s, at 214-16, 229-31 nn.88-99, 240-41 (1983).
46. Edwards, Disjunction, supra note 41, at 34.
47. Id. at 35.
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The judge explicitly said he was aiming at the "elite" law schools, 4 8
but it is clear he attacked all of us. There is an enormous trickle down
effect in the world of legal education. As Professor Graham Lilly
points out, a mere five of the 175 accredited law schools graduate al-
most one-third of all the law professors, and the top twenty schools
produce a remarkable sixty percent. 49
V. FROM PRACTICAL TO THEORETICAL SCHOLARSHIP
The content of the nation's law reviews depicts fairly well what is
happening in the law colleges. Therefore, an examination of the criti-
cisms necessitates a look at changing law review purposes and at the
various philosophical movements in the world of law school academe
after World War II. The story is best told chronologically.
In an earlier time, the chief purposes of a law review were to give
news of the institution and assist practitioners. The first Harvard
Law Review stated that its
object, primarily, is to set forth work done in the school with which we are
connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have studied law in Cam-
bridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are interested in the subject of legal
education, some idea of what is being done under the Harvard system of in-
struction. Yet we are not without hopes that the Review may be serviceable to
the profession at large.50
This seems to describe a student newsletter rather than a scholarly
periodical.
In 1922, the Nebraska Law Review was established.51 The purpose
set forth was a narrow one: "to state and criticize Nebraska law in
selected fields, in such a way as to be of service to the profession. The
citation of Nebraska cases will be exhaustive; the law of other jurisdic-
tions will be stated only for comparison."5 2 A cursory look at the first
twelve volumes of the Review shows the Nebraska law faculty was
very capable of carrying out that goal. Roscoe Pound had left Ne-
braska for Northwestern, but excellent and well-known professors re-
mained. Among the early contributors were Warren Seavey, L. Dale
Coffman, Maurice Merrill, Dean Henry Foster, and Lawrence Vold.
The subjects were the bread and butter stuff of the practice; they in-
cluded the law of covenants, quiet title, agency, execution of deeds,
48. Id. at 34.
49. Lilly, supra note 13, at 1453-54. Professor Lilly states that 87% of the professors
at the top 20 schools graduated from one of these national law schools, and then
he quotes the following from an ABA report: "Were we biologists studying in-
breeding, we might predict that successive generations of inbeciles would be pro-
duced by such a system." Id. at 1454.
50. Notes, 1 HA~v. L. REv. 35 (1887).
51. The original name of the Review was the Nebraska Law Bulletin. It became the
Nebraska Law Review in 1941.
52. Foreword, 1 NEB. L. BuLL. 4 (1922).
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corporate organization, the parol evidence rule, intent to pass title,
landlord and tenant law, the rule in Shelley's Case,53 criminal proce-
dure, conditional sales, and counties to which summons may issue.
David Fellman, my undergraduate political science teacher and a dis-
tinguished scholar at Nebraska and later at the University of Wiscon-
sin, contributed an article about the Nebraska law of due process.
Within a decade, however, all this had changed at Harvard, Ne-
braska, and the other law schools. During the same year that Roscoe
Pound made his famous 1931 criticism of Realism, 5 4 Judge Benjamin
Cardozo made less publicized observations. 55 Cardozo recognized
that law teaching had become a specialized branch of the legal profes-
sion whose function was to study the history of the law and to investi-
gate its current circumstances. Second, he noted judges had become
too burdened to do this work and to philosophize intensely. It logically
followed that in the future the task of deep meditation would fall upon
the law schools. The transition created great distrust in the bar be-
cause judges and practitioners no longer could feel sheltered from
those they regarded as "eggheads." Innovative thinking by nonpracti-
tioners and new theories would challenge the established order. As
described by Justice Cardozo,
[miost of the essays in the law reviews are written by law teachers, though
there have been notable exceptions.
... [John Dewey said] "Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently
stable world in peril, and no one can predict what will emerge in its place."
Teachers being notoriously given to thinking, one can never know what they
may do in unsettling the foundations of the established legal order.
... The leading cause [of distrust and prejudice] ... has been a dislocation
of existing balances, a disturbance of the weights of authority and influence.
Judges and advocates may not relish the admission, but the sobering truth is
that leadership in the march of legal thought has been passing in our day from
the benches of the courts to the chairs of the universities.
This change of leadership has stimulated a willingness to cite the law re-
view essays in briefs and in opinions in order to buttress a conclusion. More
and more, law reviews are becoming the organs of university life in the field of
law and jurisprudence. The advance in the prestige of the universities has
been accompanied, as might be expected, with a corresponding advance in the
prestige of their organs.
No longer is [a judge's] material confined to precedents in sheep-
skin .... "[Hie may use any material .... " He may look to law or to litera-
ture, to economics or to philosophy, to saints or to sinners, to workers or to
53. When I was a law student, one of my professors was said to have read and under-
stood James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake, the rule against perpetuities, and the rule
in Shelley's Case. For a parody about the latter rule, see Andrew J. McClurg,
Alphabet Soup, A-B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 16.
54. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1931).
55. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1931).
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drones. If his seigniory extends to flefs not marked as legal, the impulse be-
comes the stronger to exert it in regions where the denizens are near of kin.
Under the drive of this impulse, the law teacher and the law reviews are com-
ing to their own.
5 6
If Cardozo was right, and I think history demonstrates he was,
then it follows that by the 1930s, the reviews had become an impor-
tant voice in our ongoing national seminar. Today, the articles in the
reviews continue to be influential. It therefore follows that student
law review editors must answer the charges made against them.
One accusation is that editors are young and inexperienced-how
can they identify a good article from a bad one? With no background,
a young law student cannot possibly fathom a new and major contri-
bution to legal literature. This criticism may be true, but I think the
matter is almost always overcome by consultation with a faculty mem-
ber who specializes in the topic.
So now the students face the principal and much more serious in-
dictment: the ratio of "practical" to "theoretical" articles has dropped
from 4-5:1 to 1:1,57 and editors are to blame. To understand the stu-
dent defense to this charge, a bit of history is helpful. Before World
War II, law professors and law students wrote materials helpful to all
branches of the profession, but the clear trend since the war has been
to use the journals for dialogues between law professors5 8 or for ex-
changes between the law schools and other people in the university,
chiefly in the economics department, but also scholars doing research
in fields such as philosophy, sociology, and political science.
The origin of this shift away from concentrating on law for practi-
tioners and judges began between 1937 and 1942, when Supreme
Court decisions confirmed the constitutionality of Franklin Roosevelt's
56. Id. at viii-x.
57. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 204 (1994). In my opinion, none
of the critics has provided a thoughtful discussion of why an evenly balanced ra-
tio of practical to theoretical articles is problematic.
On May 28, 1994, Professor Glendon, who is the Learned Hand Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School, gave a commencement address at Catholic Univer-
sity. During her address, she said "[t]he production of scholarship [by the na-
tion's 6000 law professors] that is useful to the bench and bar (or even about law
at all!) no longer commands the prestige it once enjoyed. Suffice to say that we
professors are experiencing our own version of life at the edge of chaos." Mary
Ann Glendon, Law in a Time of Turbulence, in 60 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
620, 621 (1994).
58. See A oNONY T. KaoNmAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 265 (1993). Professor Glendon states that the law professors not only
write for each other, but also attempt to influence judges by engaging in what she
calls "advocacy scholarship." GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS, supra note
57, at 208. See also Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of 'Impracti-
cal" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2010, 2011




New Deal and, in doing so, completely altered our constitutional struc-
ture.59 The New Deal created a massive federal bureaucracy, and the
numerous administrative agencies caused the emphasis to shift ab-
ruptly from private to public law.
In the legal education world, the first major response to this monu-
mental change was made by Myres McDougal, a Yale law professor,
and Harold Lasswell, a Yale political scientist. They urged a complete
revision of the pre-World War II curriculum. The emphasis now was
to be on training students "for policy-making."6o Professor Robert Ste-
vens called the Lasswell-McDougal article a tour de force6 l-it
changed the thinking in the law schools and clearly marked the start
of the post-Realist period. The Lasswell-McDougal proposals were
adopted by some schools, but on the whole, the article "itself, in terms
of producing radical change in legal education, was almost completely
unsuccessful."
6 2
In this context, the experience at the Nebraska College of Law is
interesting. Dean Frederick Beutel assembled a fine group to reopen
the school after the war. Edmund Belsheim had shared a suite of
rooms with Myres McDougal at Oxford, and they had been assigned to
the same law tutor.6 3 Dean Beutel's views and those of his colleague,
Professor Julius Cohen, were close to McDougal's; they foresaw that
post-war legal education demanded "that the law schools now become
policy-wise." 64 The new curriculum at Nebraska was fundamentally
59. See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 683 (1946).
60. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1943)(empha-
sis omitted).
61. STEVENS, supra note 45, at 265.
62. Id. at 266.
63. See Myres S. McDougal, Life With Edmund Belsheim, AnVoc., Autumn 1985, at
8.
64. Julius Cohen, Crisis in Legal Education, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 588, 592 (1948). See
also Frederick K. Beutel, Changes Necessary in the Law Curriculum to Meet the
Role of Lawyers in Modern Society, 9 LAw. GUILD REv. 89 (1949); Frederick K.
Beutel, The Law Schools and the New Profession of Social Technique, 1 AM. J.
EcoN. & Soc. 93 (1942); Frederick K. Beutel, The New Curriculum at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska College of Law, 25 NEB. L. REV. 177 (1946)[hereinafter The New
Curriculum]; Julius Cohen, Factors of Resistance to the Resources of the Behav-
ioral Sciences, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67 (1959). For further commentary on the inno-
vative programs at Northwestern and Nebraska, see STEVENS, supra note 45, at
224 n.53, 227-28 n.80; Carl Circo, 1903 & 1946: The Making and Remaking of the
University of Nebraska College of Law, 57 NEB. L. REv. 44, 61-75 (1978).
As part of the post-war plan to teach more public law, many prominent
schools at one time or another adopted the two-four plan, but today all the schools
require a three-year curriculum. Dean Beutel patterned the Nebraska two-four
plan on the experiences of the law schools at Chicago, Minnesota, Northwestern,
Stanford, Washington, William and Mary, Illinois, and Louisiana State. See
Beutel, The New Curriculum, supra, at 177 n.2, 181 n.13; Circo, supra, at 62-70.
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different than the pre-war one. It was a four-year program designed
to give basic training in how to become a lawyer, with an additional
emphasis on giving useful background in the social sciences. From
1949 until 1959, a sociologist was a member of the law faculty, and an
innovative "Legislative Laboratory" was part of the curriculum. It
was a good program. I was there, so I know. But by the early 1960s,
the College had returned to a three-year program, and many of the
innovations of the Beutel period were abandoned. Nonetheless,
neither Nebraska nor any other law school ever returned to a pedagog-
ical approach of almost exclusive practical training.
The obstacle to the policy-makers' approach was that law students
are interested in becoming lawyers, not in learning to make public pol-
icy. But even though the McDougal, Lasswell, Beutel, and Cohen-type
proposals were short lived in action, the desire for change, this time
radical change, did not die. It cropped up again in the 1970s when the
writings of Roberto Unger, Duncan Kennedy, and Morton Horwitz
gave rise to the critical legal studies movement (CLS).65 A law profes-
sors' crusade springing from deep disenchantment, the movement had
little impact outside the law schools. 6 6 Unger, Kennedy, and Horwitz
were like three men in a rowboat attacking a battleship. Inside
academe, however, their ideas caused several fairly large controver-
sies. If the following definition is accurate, it is immediately apparent
why the majority of practitioners and judges were less than enthusias-
tic about CLS scholarship. In fact, conservative law teachers and
members of the bar were downright hostile. One CLS group put its
formative statement this way:
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in
which legal doctrine and legal education and the practices of legal institutions
work to buttress and support a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian
relations. Critical theory works to develop radical alternatives, and to explore
and debate the role of law in the creation of social, economic and political rela-
tions that will advance human emancipation.
6 7
See also ROBERT A. STEIN, IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF MINNESOTA LAw SCHOOL 102-12, 130-35 (1980); William B. Lockhardt,
The Minnesota Program for Legal Education, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 234 (1950).
Dean Fraser at Minnesota said there was no doubt in his mind "that students
can do as effective law study after two years of college work as they can after
four." Fraser, An Integrated Course of Training for Lawyers, 34 HANDBOOK, ASs'N
OF Azu. L. SCHS. 60, 62 (1936). In 1963, Professor David F. Cavers of Harvard
proposed a plan for two-calendar-year legal education based on six trimesters.
See David F. Cavers, A Proposal: Legal Education in Two Calendar Years, 49
A.B_. J. 475 (1963).
65. See, e.g., MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORIATION OF AMjERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CRITiciSm OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976).
66. KlomAN, supra note 58, at 242. See also id. at 249, 253-54, 261.
67. Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt, Introduction to PETER FITZPATRICK, CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1-2 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987). See generally
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Orthodoxy and traditional legal doctrines were to be jettisoned to
end "domination" of the poor and the oppressed. The existing legal
structure sheltered the top; now it was necessary to shield the "bot-
tom." The mere recital of the purposes is sufficient to show that the
considerable amount of theoretical literature produced by the move-
ment was of little interest or value to judges.
While CLS lost momentum, the influence of Unger and his associ-
ates did not die. Again a scholarship tree shriveled, but the ideas
sprang up in somewhat different models. People who formerly would
have been CLS members became critical race scholars 68 or feminist
scholars. 69 The overall theme of feminism is that women are
subordinated in capitalist (and other) societies, and their position
must be changed. The CLS movement and feminism are both revolu-
tionary in the sense that the objective is radical change. The femi-
nism movement gained greatly in strength during the 1970s and
1980s, when women in vastly increasing numbers chose to make a ca-
reer in the legal profession.
In 1968, women accounted for less than ten percent of the students
enrolled in approved schools; a decade later, it was more than a
third.70 This, together with the inclusion of minorities, constitutes
the most extraordinary development in the history of legal education,
and it brought an entirely new form of theoretical scholarship to the
law reviews. Gender issues moved to the forefront, and articles in the
form of story-telling became popular.71 Of course, it appears self-evi-
dent that narrative fiction is hardly what Judge Edwards turns to
when he has a concrete case to resolve. Nevertheless, feminist litera-
ture has directed attention to issues about women at work, in the
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). See also David L.
Gregory, Book Review, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1138 (reviewing MARx KELmAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)); Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education,
71 IowA L. REV. 1063, 1081-82 (1986)(-he goal of some CLS scholarship ... is to
demonstrate the incoherence and contradiction of existing [establishment] doc-
trines."). Ronald Dworkin states that CLS scholars "may want to show law in its
worst rather than its best light, to show avenues closed that are in fact open, to
move toward a new mystification in service of undisclosed political goals." RON-
ALD DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPiRE 275 (1986).
68. See Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (book
review).
69. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997). Pro-
fessor Derrick Bell wrote the Foreward. Each of the book's seven parts is fol-
lowed by suggested readings, and an extensive bibliography is included. Id. at
399-410.
70. STEVENS, supra note 45, at 246; TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-
SION, AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 18
(Robert MacCrate ed., 1992).
71. See Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholar-
ship, 74 NEB. L. REV. 479 (1995); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1992).
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home, in sports, and in the Armed Forces, as well as topics focusing on
gender, sexual identity, social attitudes, marriage, reproduction, child
support, child care, abortion, relations between the sexes, standards
for prosecuting sexual harassment charges, spousal abuse, child
abuse, poverty, health care, old age, retirement income and pension
reform, and many other issues of public responsibility affecting almost
everybody's welfare. In addition, women have made great inroads to-
ward ending Anglo, male domination of law school faculties, the judici-
ary, and legal jobs.
Professor Owen Fiss points out that in the late 1970s, feminists led
by Professor Catharine McKinnon caused two major shifts in legal
paradigms affecting women. First, the concept of equality for women
departed from its focus on antidiscrimination regarding individuals
and gravitated toward the group approach of removing social subordi-
nation. Second, feminists began to express vehement hostility to a so-
cial structure that results from the objectification of women into
sexual objects for male gratification. This, of course, lead to vigorous
campaigns against pornography during the past two decades. 72
Some critics assert feminist scholarship emphasizes problems
faced by educated American women who become lawyers, account-
ants, professors, and executives, and fails to adequately address the
difficulties of unskilled women who earn low wages and receive lim-
ited (or no) benefits working in private households, nursery schools,
day care centers, laundries, and the fast food industry.73
Another major reason for the vast increase in theoretical law re-
view literature is "law and (blank)" scholarship. The possibilities are
endless.7 4 Once we fill in the blank, we have a specialized course in
the law school. The most prominent of the interdisciplinary "law and
(blank)" subjects is law and economics. This movement's goal is the
economic analysis of law. One of its foremost parents is Judge Rich-
ard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit and a former law professor at the University of Chicago. His 1992
book, Sex and Reason,7 5 shows the extremes to which economic stud-
ies can be taken. The judge presents what he calls "the economic the-
ory of sexuality,"7 6 but as often is the case with economic analysis,
72. OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALiSm DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 69-71 (1996).
73. See, e.g., David Frum, Why Good Help Is Hard to Find, WOMEN'S L.Q. 4-6 (Winter
1997), reprinted in CURRENT, May 1997, at 39.
74. See supra notes 4-9. The possibilities are countless. Several additional examples
include Law and Inequity: A Journal of Theory and Practice; Law & Sexuality: A
Review of Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues; Santa Clara Computer & High Technol-
ogy Law Review; and Texas Review of Law and Politics.
75. RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX .i'D REASON (1992).
76. Id. at 3.
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little attention is given to the moral aspects of sex.7 7 Judge Edwards
probably would say he could learn a great deal from the book, but on
the other hand, it is doubtful he would regard it as useful in his day to
day work. Professor William Eskridge considers the book an impor-
tant contribution to the law of sexuality in general and the law of ho-
mosexuality in particular. Still, he acknowledges that sexuality
cannot be a morally indifferent object of study, and a cost-benefit ap-
proach to the subject is doomed.78
Unquestionably, law and economics has impacted antitrust prac-
tice and contributed significantly to communications law, transporta-
tion law, commercial damages, and environmental regulation. As
Judge Posner points out, it has armed divorcing women with an inter-
est in their husbands' professional degrees. 79 Even criminal sentenc-
ing has been affected.8 0 And, because of law and economics, law
students taking a course in contract law now study transaction cost
economics; in Torts, least cost avoiders; in Corporations, capital asset
pricing.8i In Water Law, Planning, and Policy (a course I taught for
many years), students need to understand concepts such as marginal
cost pricing, equimarginal value in use, market transfers, cost-benefit
analysis, Pareto criterion, water banking, externalities, the problem of
the commons, Barnett's Lunch Law,8 2 effluent taxes vs. market incen-
tives, and class action techniques.
Law and economics scholarship has been beneficial to legal schol-
arship, but if interdisciplinary work leads almost completely to the
academic side of our assignment and away from the task of educating
students to become lawyers, then we should rethink the matter. I
have several reservations. Even though numerous benefits have re-
sulted from interdisciplinary work, some people fear that professors
will want each discipline to become a separate department of the law
school. This, of course, would lead to what Paul Carrington at one
77. Robert P. George, Can Sex Be Reasonable?, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1993)(book
review).
78. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and
Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992)(book
review).
79. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalizion of Legal Teaching and Scholarship,
91 MicH. L. REv. 1921, 1925 (1993).
80. Id. at 1926.
81. George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between Legal Practice and Legal Edu-
cation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 681, 682 (1988).
82. Assume half a dozen or more people eat lunch together, and the bill always is
divided evenly, rather than apportioned on the basis of what each person ordered.
It follows that if six or more people go to lunch, each will order the most expen-
sive thing on the menu. The rule has important applications not only to individ-
ual behavior, but also to the behavior of Congress and state legislatures.
[Vol. 76:681
LAW REVIEWS
time called "graduatization" of law schools.83 Second, Dean Kronman
has a point when he states that the ascent of the law and economics
movement has done more than anything in the last twenty-five years
to undermine what he calls the law training of lawyer-statesmen. Re-
liance on economic models sometimes blinds us to the virtues of char-
acter, prudence, and practical wisdom.8 4
Another objection is that sound decisionmaking depends upon
more than studying the effects of efficiency and distribution. In short,
students should focus on more than the size of capital and how the
shares will be distributed. One economist set up an illustrative case
in which use of DDT in food production damaged the penguin popula-
tion. Then he said that his criterion was oriented to humans and that
damage to penguins, sugar pines, and geological marvels simply was
irrelevant. He concluded penguins were important because people en-
joy seeing them walk about the rocks, but that he had "no interest in
preserving penguins for their own sake."85 I, of course, disagree. If
people want to preserve penguins regardless of economic considera-
tions, and I think they do, then there must be concern for noneconomic
judgments.
In summary, we have observed that following World War II, law
reviews became much more theoretical and thus considerably less val-
uable to practitioners and judges. Some, like Judge Edwards, believe
this abandonment of "doctrine" for "theory" is unfortunate and has re-
sulted in a significant disjunction between legal education and the
legal profession. A number of scholars are not persuaded that the
judge's charges are supported by the evidence,86 but others see the
matter differently. His point is well taken that law schools are profes-
sional schools and occupy a favored position in the universities to a
large extent because they are backed by bar associations. For that
reason, law reviews cannot distance themselves too far from the disci-
pline of the name they bear and to which they owe an explanation for
the condition Judge Edwards, and many others, deplore.
It also should be observed that, beginning in the 1950s, legal schol-
arship showed a vigorous expansion of interest in issues of govern-
mental practice. Instead of focusing on "how things are" articles, law
reviews began to devote more space to commentary that centered on
social policies. A quick perusal of the law reviews for the past four
decades depicts some of the most popular subjects-discrimination on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age,
83. See Paul D. Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 11, 12 (1986).
84. See KRONmAN, supra note 58, 225-40.
85. Wn.uLi F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS-THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5
(1974).
86. Support for my view is found in Saks et al., supra note 42.
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or national origin; urban crime; capital punishment; familial rela-
tions; abortion; the Establishment Clause; and protection of the poor,
the physically ill, the criminally accused, and the infirm. In connec-
tion with these matters, the law reviews became teachers in the ongo-
ing, often painful, national dialogue. The women's movement, civil
rights groups, critical legal studies, and the law and economics move-
ment crowded out practical law review pieces. I think this is the ex-
planation student editors would give for the decreasing ratio of
practical to theoretical articles. It is not the fault of the editors, but
that of their mentors, the professors who write and submit the arti-
cles. The editors say submit a practical article and we will consider
publishing it.
In connection with the struggle to balance the theoretical and prac-
tical, I also should note that many of the tensions Judge Frank and
Judge Edwards describe arise because the law colleges have a split set
of characteristics. The schools are located in universities where aca-
demicians focus on the question "Why." But some circumstances arise
when professional schools should show how practitioners approach a
problem.
Regarding this never-ending matter about how much practical
training should be offered, the law school faculties are a house divided.
For instance, some schools employ "anything but law" teachers, who
are referred to as ABL faculty.87 They are employed mostly in the
elite schools and teach mostly the "law and (blank)" courses, chiefly
Law and Economics. They want to be known to their colleagues as
academicians, not as lawyers. I am confident, however, they realize
that if ABL is carried too far, the Bar eventually will impose some
voice in law school curricula. In a final confrontation, the Bar has the
trump-card-authority to admit applicants to the practice of law. Not
even the heavily-endowed schools are exempt from the risk that the
Bar will intervene in curriculum matters. Therefore, more and more
faculty members support the move toward clinical education that sat-
isfies some of Judge Edwards' concerns.8 8 After all, when most law
school deans address alumni and bar association groups, they yearn to
describe some activities at the school that directly relate to the prac-
tice of law.
87. The ABL characterization is attributed to Professor Jay Westbrook of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1239.
88. See generally Roy T. Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law: The Times They
Are A-Changin', 75 NEB. L. REv. 648 (1996).
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VI. YET ANOTHER ACCUSATION: LAW REVIEWS ARE THE
CAUSE OF THE SUPREME COURTS POOR
LITERARY STYLE
At this point, the students think they have provided adequate ex-
planation for the modem ratio between practical and theoretical arti-
cles only to face with disbelief the indictment that they are responsible
for the poor literary style in opinions of the United States Supreme
Court. The charge was made by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a
1994 New York Times interview. The Justice said that because law
review trained clerks write a Justice's initial opinions, "[it is scarcely
surprising that the standard opinion style has become that of student-
run reviews: bland and bloodless, prolix, platitudinous, always erring
on the side of inclusion, full of lengthy citations and footnotes-and
above all dull."89
The clerks' obvious defense to Justice Ginburg's assertion is that
the fault is with the Justices. They sign the opinions and hold them
out to the public as their own work. Some time ago I predicted that
the writing techniques of the Justices would improve as the number of
signed opinions decreased. In the 1986 Term, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's first, there were 152 signed opinions. By 1992 Term, the
number was 114; 1993, 87; 1994, 86; 1995, 79; and, by 1996, 86. My
prophecy, of course, proved wrong.
It also should be pointed out that Justices like Holmes, Cardozo,
and Hughes would be dumbfounded to learn that the law clerks have
such a leading role in the screening of cases that the Court will hear
and the drafting and designing of the opinions. Those justices would
reduce the role of the clerks drastically. Professor Philip Kurland of
the University of Chicago expressed the matter aptly when he said "I
think Brandeis would be aghast."90
VII. A FINAL COMPLAINT: A GREAT DEAL OF LAW REVIEW
LANGUAGE IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE
This complaint is justifiable-law review language frequently is in-
comprehensible. The following examples are set forth to illustrate the
89. BERNARD ScHwARTz, DECISION: How THE SuIREars COURT DECIDES CASES 54
(1996)(quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg). See also WmLImii DoINARSMI, IN THE
OPINION OF THE COURT 30-42, 55-68 (1996)(discussing how various Supreme
Court Justices have utilized their law clerks); WnuiAm H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREm COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 298-301 (1987); James P. Frank, John
Willard Hurst-Memorial Remarks, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 1131, 1133 (noting that
Justice Brandeis claimed that the Supreme Court Justices "[did] their own
work").
90. SciiAvrz, supra note 89, at 50. See also Tony Maure, Justices Give Pivotal Role
to Novice Lawyers, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1A
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point. None are atypical. The first two were written by renowned au-
thorities in the law and economics movement.
The first is a definition of what the authors call Pareto optimality:
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would
lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained
by it that they could not compensate those who lost from it and still be better
off than before. 9 1
The second example was written by Judge Posner. It may perplex
the uninitiated.
The principal benefit of prohibiting abortions is the value of each fetus saved
times the number saved, the latter being a function of the percentage of abor-
tions that prohibition actually prevents or deters, which we are assuming
(probably extravagantly) to be 30 percent, and the number of abortions re-
quired to reduce the population by one, which I am assuming to be 1.83. The
benefits of the prohibition are therefore v, that value of one fetus saved, times
.16n (.3/1.83 = .16), where n is the average number of abortions that would be
performed each year but for the prohibition.
9 2
I simply have not had time to figure out what the judge means.
But, if this is what the law review students are reading, it adds weight
to Justice Ginsburg's complaint of indoctrination. Judge Posner per-
haps wants a deserved appointment to the Supreme Court and wrote
the paragraph to prove that he is well-qualified. It may show him too
much so.
After the Judge Posner example is received in evidence, the stu-
dents object on the ground that all illustrations of incomprehensible
language are by law and economics scholars. The decisionmakers
then rule that from the hundreds of available samples, the law review
critics may introduce one. They select the following passage:
Of course, no political discourse can pass into nonmeaning. Its goal, Marx
stated explicitly, is to reach the goal of interpretation: interpreting the world
in order to transform it according to our needs and desires. Now, from the
position of the post-Freudian, post-phenomenological analyst-a position
which is really an untenable locus of rationality, a close proximity of meaning
and nonmeaning-it is clear that there is no World (or that the World is not
all there is) and that to transform it is only one of the circles of the interpreta-
tion-be it Marxist-which refuses to perceive that it winds around a void.9 3
91. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1093-94 (1972).
The authors refer to this as the rule of Pareto optimality, but more precisely it
appears to state the Kaldor-Hicks precept. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A.
STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NuIsANCE LAW 16-17 (1992);
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAV: FROM Pos-
NER TO POST-MODERNISM 19-21 (1997).
92. POSNER, supra note 75, at 286.
93. Sidney W. DeLong, Jacques of All Trades: Derrida, Lacan, and the Commercial
Lawyer, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 131, 132 n.4 (1995)(quoting Julia Kristeva, Psychoa-
nalysis and the Polis, in W.J. THOMAS MITCHELL, THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETA-
TION 83, 93 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983)).
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Professor Sidney DeLong is called as an expert witness and, having
read the passage, testifies that "even though I know the meaning of all
the words used, even though I can identify the subjects and verbs of
all the sentences, I haven't the faintest idea of what she means. Not
even a little bit. Not a single thought. None. Zip. Nihil."94
VIII. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN OPPOSITION TO ABOLISHING
LAW REVIEWS
For the students in the dock, an excellent closing defense of their
law reviews will be formidable endorsements by some of the most
prominent and respected people in the legal profession. Imagine some
of the judges whose statements might be put before the deci-
sionmakers. The first testimony is given by a judge on the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, Judge Stanley Fuld.
Such [the law journal articles discussed by the judge] ... has earned the real
respect of the bench. We admire the law review for its scholarship, its accu-
racy, and, above all, for its excruciating fairness. We are well aware that the
review takes very seriously its role as judge of judges-and to that, we say,
more power to you. By your criticism, your views, your appraising cases, your
tracing the trends, you render the making of "new" law a little easier. In a
real sense, you thus help to keep our system of law an open one, ever ready to
keep pace with challenging patterns.9 5
Justice Douglas liked law reviews. He wrote that he had "a special
affection for law reviews.... [I] have drawn heavily from them for
ideas and guidance as practitioner, as teacher, and as judge."9 6 An-
other judge of the Court of Appeals of New York wrote, "[tihere can be
no question that academic writing has established its impact on the
law."9 7
At this point in the hearing, the law review students will call two
former Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court. First,
Charles Evans Hughes, who states that "in confronting any serious
problem, a wide-awake and careful judge will at once look to see if the
subject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and analyzed,
in a good law journal."9 8
The next witness is Chief Justice Earl Warren, who stated that
[tihe American law review properly has been called the most remarkable in-
stitution of the law school world. To a lawyer, its articles and comments may
be indispensable professional tools. To a judge ... the review may be both a
94. Id.
95. Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918
(1953).
96. Douglas, supra note 58, at 227.
97. Judith S. Kayne, One Judge's View ofAcademic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 313, 317 (1989).
98. Charles Evans Hughes, Foreward, 50 YALE L.J. 737 (1941).
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severe critic and a helpful guide. But perhaps most important, the review
affords invaluable training to the students.9 9
A surprise witness will close the testimony for the law review stu-
dents. Justice Felix Frankfurter will tell the decisionmakers that he
agreed to testify to quell the story that he turned down an offer to
become a member of the Harvard Law Review.' 0 0 He testifies that the
myth began because his situation was confused with that of Judge
Learned Hand, who we recall, quit the Review at Harvard.1 0 Justice
Frankfurter now sets the record straight when he affirms that he
served on the Harvard Law Review, and as evidence of his continuing
strong support, relates that he sat on the United States Supreme
Court from January 1939 to August 1962, during which time forty-one
of his forty-two clerks had law review experience.X0 2 All but three
graduated from Harvard.' 0 3 He concludes by informing the deci-
sionmakers that his practice of hiring law review members is typical
of all Supreme Court Justices, and he cannot think of a better defense
than that for the students.
IX. A POSSIBLE, BUT UNLIKELY CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES
I expect no significant changes in American law reviews unless law
schools follow the national trend of periodic post-tenure review of
every professor. The performance assessments might be routine, say,
every five years, or triggered by a certain number of unfavorable eval-
uations within a specified period. Such a periodic evaluation, I
surmise, would be based on the historical three-legged stool-teach-
ing, scholarship, and service. A post-tenure appraisal would greatly
increase the number of thoughtful articles from which the law reviews
99. Earl Warren, Message of Greeting to the U.C.L.A. Law Review, 1 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1953).
100. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Look Who's Editing at Law Reviews, LINGUA RANcA, Jan.-
Feb. 1996, at 63.
101. See GUNTHER, supra note 19.
102. See JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DLARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 350 (1975). The
list of Justice Frankfurter's clerks contains many familiar contributors to every
area of the law: Joseph P. Rauh, Jr., Adrian Fisher, Edward F. Prichard, Jr.,
Philip L. Graham, Philip Elman, Stanley Silverberg, Harry K. Mansfield, Philip
B. Kurland, Elliot L. Richardson, Louis Henkin, Irving J. Helman, Albert J. Re-
senthal, William T. Coleman, Fred N. Fishman, Albert M. Sacks, Hugh H. Cal-
kins, Weaver W. Dunnan, Abram J. Chayes, Vincent L. McKusick, Alexander M.
Bickel, Donald T. Trautman, Frank E.A. Sander, James Vorenberg, Matthew G.
Herold, Jr., E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Richard E. Sherwood, Harry H. Welling-
ton, Andrew L. Kaufman, Jerome A. Cohen, J. William Doolittle, John H. Mans-
field, Richard N. Goodwin, Howard L. Kalodner, Paul M. Bender, Morton M.
Winston, Anthony G. Amsterdam, John D. French, Daniel Mayers, David P. Cur-




could choose, as there are 4201 professors, 1186 associate professors,
661 assistant professors, and 180 deans in ABA accredited law
schools.104 No longer would there be a complaint of an oversupply of
student-edited journals.
Professors George Schatzki and Paul Carrington discussed post-
tenure evaluations at the 1990 meeting of the AALS and concluded
the process could be benign, provided policy implementation, awaited
the death of any person subjected to it.105
X. CONCLUSION
Prominent professors foresee different futures for the law schools.
Some see institutions that have no special responsibility to prepare
students for the practice because "[1]aw professors are not paid to
train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what
they happen to discover."106 Other professors predict the law schools
will resemble the university model with a curriculum consisting of
minigraduate courses in applied economics, social theory, and political
science.10 7 Possibly these ideas are limited to the schools Harry Wel-
lington, former dean at Yale, thinks are superior to the rest. His view
is that
[tihere are a dozen or so university law schools in the county that can properly
claim to be more than trade schools. A trade school is an institution that
views its purpose as graduating students who will pass a bar examination.
Schools that are more than trade schools share this purpose, but they are cen-
trally concerned with knowledge through teaching and research. Among the
twelve or so law schools with these larger aspirations, Yale rightly is regarded
as the most ambitious. 1 0 8
Dean Wellington says today's law professors must get a grip on the
limits of law by being sophisticates in the social sciences, political phi-
104. These numbers were obtained from the AALS on April 8, 1997.
105. See 1990 AALS PRoc. 9. See also Paul D. Carrington, One Law: The Role of
Legal Education in the Opening of the Legal Profession Since 1776, 44 FLA. L.
REv. 501, 598 n.511 (1992).
106. "Of Law and River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1, 26 (1985)(letter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington). The principle is
fine if limited to Professor Fiss and perhaps a few other law school teachers. See
OwEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Fiss, supra note 72; William G.
Buss, The Government as Friend and Protector of Free Speech, 82 IowA L. REV.
301 (1996)(book review). I am uncertain, however, regarding what, if anything,
many professors would discover. I think overall the present more structured ap-
proach to teaching is preferable.
107. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 440 (1983). See also George L. Priest, The
Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Produc-
tion of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1929 (1993);
Priest, supra note 81.




losophy, distributive justice, economics, and history.1O9 I agree with
Judge Posner when he writes that
[the professor] who makes it his business to be learned in the law and expert
in parsing cases and statutes is made by Dean Wellington to seem a paltry
fellow, a Philistine who has shirked the more ambitious and challenging task
of mastering political and moral philosophy, economics, history, and other so-
cial sciences and humanities so that he can discourse on large questions of
policy and justice.1 1 0
I do not believe the prediction that the law schools will become
compartmentalized is well-founded. Rather, I foresee that most
schools will recognize that their primary mission is the training of stu-
dents to become lawyers. That is what the majority of the students
expect when they arrive to study. Law reviews play an important role
in the pursuit of that goal, but regrettably, too few students have the
experience. A former dean of the Northwestern Law School once
wrote, in oft-quoted language, that "[w]hereas most periodicals are
published primarily in order than they may be read, the law reviews
are published in order that they may be written."111 There is truth in
the remark even though we know it was made somewhat tongue-in-
cheek.
Despite criticisms such as those made by Judge Edwards, all
branches of the profession extensively delve into law reviews. When
confronted with a problem, my lifelong habit is to first browse the law
review literature.
In addition to educational and research functions, the reviews help
fulfill other objectives. They reflect contemporary scholarship and are
repositories of knowledge that we pass from one generation to the
next. Most importantly, law reviews represent the public interest by
providing a forum for calm, well-reasoned, and thorough analysis of
what courts and legislatures are doing and how well they are doing it.
Some law school deans and professors urge doing away with stu-
dent-edited reviews and replacing them with faculty journals. Others
suggest dividing the law reviews into two parts: the faculty would se-
lect and edit lead articles; students would retain supervision of the
casenotes, comments, and book review sections.
Both notions seem imprudent. When professors spend substantial
amounts of their time and energy culling over and polishing other peo-
ple's articles, teaching and service suffer. Abandoning student-con-
trolled reviews would remake the nature of law schools, to no clear or
certain advantage.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1119.
111. Harold C. Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 22,
24 (1956).
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After reading and reflecting upon American law reviews for more
than fifty years, I am convinced the student-run reviews are a unique
and uniquely American tradition that is best left as is.
